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Through metacognitive evaluations, individuals assess their own cognitive operations
with respect to their current goals. We have previously shown that non-verbal social
cues spontaneously influence these evaluations, even when the cues are unreliable.
Here, we explore whether a belief about the reliability of the source can modulate this
form of social impact. Participants performed a two-alternative forced choice task that
varied in difficulty. The task was followed by a video of a person who was presented
as being either competent or incompetent at performing the task. That person provided
random feedback to the participant through facial expressions indicating agreement,
disagreement or uncertainty. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation by
rating their confidence in their answer. Results revealed that participants’ confidence
was higher following agreements. Interestingly, this effect was merely reduced but not
canceled for the incompetent individual, even though participants were able to perceive
the individual’s incompetence. Moreover, perceived agreement induced zygomaticus
activity, but only when the feedback was provided for difficult trials by the competent
individual. This last result strongly suggests that people implicitly appraise the relevance
of social feedback with respect to their current goal. Together, our findings suggest
that people always integrate social agreement into their metacognitive evaluations, even
when epistemic vigilance mechanisms alert them to the risk of being misinformed.
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Introduction
Other than communicating important information about others’ feelings and attitudes (George
and Conty, 2008), non-verbal social cues such as gaze or facial expression also provide
circumstantial information that may guide people’s decisions. Remarkably, non-verbal social cues
can spontaneously aﬀect metacognitive evaluations of past decisions (Eskenazi et al., in revision).
Metacognition refers to the process by which individuals monitor and control their likely success
Abbreviations: 2AFC, two alternative forced choice; RFRs, rapid facial reactions; EMG, electromyography; PP, previous
participants; SE, standard error; SD, standard deviation; RTs, reaction times.
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in cognitive tasks (Proust, 2010). As we make a decision,
we concurrently monitor our mental activity in order to
regulate information processing and behavior (Koriat, 2007).
In experimental research, metacognitive evaluations are usually
measured by a second-order decision, which may occur in the
form of a subjective conﬁdence judgment in past performance on
a ﬁrst-order task (i.e., retrospective evaluations; Fleming et al.,
2010; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012). Several works have aimed
to identify the informational cues used by people to elaborate
their metacognitive evaluations (Alter and Oppenheimer, 2009;
Bahrami et al., 2010; Koriat and Ackerman, 2010). In previous
work from our lab, we found that people spontaneously adjust
their metacognitive retrospective evaluations based on the non-
verbal feedback given by another individual (Eskenazi et al.,
in revision). Here, we investigated whether this form of social
inﬂuence varies as a function of the reliability of the social source
providing the feedback.
In our previous work, we asked people to perform a 2AFC
perceptual task and then rate the level of conﬁdence in their
responses. Participants’ conﬁdence ratings were higher after
another person had oriented his/her gaze toward their response
(25% of trials) compared to when the person gazed at the opposite
response (25% of trials), or when there was no social cue (50%
of trials). Intriguingly, this eﬀect of non-verbal feedback on
conﬁdence ratings was present while participants were told that
the person’s gaze direction was uninformative and should be
ignored (Experiment 1). Furthermore, the eﬀect was observed
despite the fact that the person gazed at the participant’s response
only half of the time and regardless of response accuracy.
Therefore, participants viewed an equal number of trials with
objectively correct and objectively incorrect feedback, rendering
the person’s gaze direction unreliable for task purposes. Also,
using the same experimental design but leading participants
to believe that the gaze direction reﬂected a PP’s response to
the same question, the eﬀect was observed at the expense of
participants’ metacognitive sensitivity (Experiment 2). Finally,
task diﬃculty (which strongly determines participants’ degree of
certainty prior to feedback) did not modulate social inﬂuence,
which is in contrast to what previous studies may have predicted
(Festinger, 1954; Laland, 2004). Therefore, our results suggest
that people have a natural tendency to spontaneously assign
relevance and trustworthiness to social information, especially
when the social information is perceived as oﬀering positive
feedback.
In the real world, however, not all social sources are equally
reliable. A strong susceptibility of metacognition to social
information regardless of source reliability carries a major risk
of accidental or intentional misinformation. Developmental
studies consistently demonstrate that children trust others
selectively starting at 4 years of age. They monitor the
informants’ past accuracy and adjust their decisions to the
information provided to them (Harris and Corriveau, 2011;
Harris et al., 2012; Mills, 2013; Bernard et al., 2015b). We are
thus cognitively equipped to evaluate the epistemic reliability
of (social) sources of information, a capacity termed ‘epistemic
vigilance’ (Sperber et al., 2010). We seem to be able to assign
a weight to social information that determines the extent to
which we assimilate that information. Here we studied the
extent to which beliefs about the epistemic reliability of a social
source modulate the inﬂuence of non-verbal social information
on metacognitive evaluations. Gaging the reliability of an
informant mainly consists in gaging the accuracy of the message
he/she communicates (Bernard et al., 2015a). The associated
mechanisms may rely on a variety of cues, such as the quality
of the message, the perceived benevolence of the informant, the
number of congruent informants and/or one’s own perceptual
or memorial certainty (Sperber et al., 2010; Bernard et al.,
2015b). However, to be reliable, the informant must meet a
critical condition: he/she must be competent, i.e., possess genuine
information (as opposed to misinformation or no information;
Fiske et al., 2007; Sperber et al., 2010).
In an amended version of the paradigm described above,
participants in the current study performed a ﬁrst-order 2AFC
task, followed by a subjective conﬁdence rating of their own
response on each trial. Before reporting their rating, participants
saw a short video clip in which an individual either smiled and
nodded to express agreement with the participant’s response,
frowned and shook his/her head to signal disagreement, or
raised his/her eyebrows and shoulders to express uncertainty.
The participant was led to believe that these individuals were
PPs and that the expression they displayed at each trial
reﬂected whether they had given the same response as the
participant (agreement), the opposite response (disagreement),
or no response (uncertainty). However, similarly to Eskenazi
et al. (in revision), the experiment was controlled so that
participants received equal amounts of objectively correct
feedback, objectively incorrect feedback, and uncertain feedback.
Throughout the experimental session, each participant saw
two individuals, one of whom was presented as being more
competent at the task than the other. We hypothesized that
participants would be more likely to align their conﬁdence with
the non-verbal social feedback when it was provided by the more
competent individual. We also expected conﬁdence ratings to be
higher following positive feedback (agreement) than following
disagreement or uncertainty, as our previous results revealed that
people were more susceptible to positive/concordant feedback.
In addition to conﬁdence ratings, we collected participants’
facial muscle activity, as an implicit marker of feedback
processing. When exposed to facial expressions, people typically
display RFRs, which are detectable by EMGand usuallymatch the
perceived expression (Bush et al., 1986; Dimberg and Thunberg,
1998; Dimberg et al., 2000; Hess and Blairy, 2001; McIntosh,
2006). The exact mechanisms underlying RFRs remain a hotly
debated issue. Several authors have suggested that RFRs reﬂect
the internal simulation of perceived emotions, which facilitates
their understanding. In line with this notion, RFRs have been
shown to play a role in the elaboration of judgments about
perceived facial expression (Niedenthal et al., 2001; Oberman
et al., 2007) as well as ratings about one’s emotional reaction to
others’ facial expressions (e.g., Sato et al., 2013). Most importantly
for the present work, RFRs have been reported to be modulated
by the subjective relevance or meaningfulness of the facial
expression (Soussignan et al., 2013, 2015). For example, RFRs
typically increase for in-group as compared to outgroupmembers
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(McHugo et al., 1991; Bourgeois and Hess, 2008; van der Schalk
et al., 2011), and when there is potential for interaction with
others (Grèzes et al., 2013). Here, we expected to observe greater
RFRs to the facial expressions of the competent agent, who by
deﬁnition provides more reliable feedback than the incompetent
agent.
We recorded the EMG activity of participants’ zygomaticus
(the facial muscles responsible for pulling the corners of the
mouth upward into a smile) and corrugator supercilii (the facial
muscles responsible for pulling the brows together). Usually,
viewing positive facial expressions elicits increased activity of
zygomaticus major muscles, while negative facial expressions
evoke increased activity of the corrugator (Dimberg, 1982; Wild
et al., 2001; Sonnby–Borgström, 2002; Dewied et al., 2006;Weyers
et al., 2006; Sato et al., 2008; Schilbach et al., 2008; Schrammel
et al., 2009; Dimberg et al., 2011; Moody and McIntosh, 2011;
Rymarczyk et al., 2011). Here, we expected to observe RFRs (i.e.,
increased zygomaticus activity) in response to facial expressions
of agreement (as compared to disagreement and uncertainty),
and increased corrugator activity in response to disagreement
(as compared to agreement and uncertainty). Furthermore, as
markers for the implicit monitoring of competence, we expected
RFRs to be enhanced for the competent as compared to the
incompetent individual. We also expected these RFR eﬀects to
be strongly reﬂected in the zygomaticus activity, as a reﬂection of
the particular susceptibility to positive social feedback.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight volunteers participated in the experiment (14
females; mean age = 24.86 ± 0.79). All reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and had no neurological or
psychiatric history. Each participant gave their written informed
consent and received a compensation of 20€. We obtained
ethics approval from the local research ethics committee (CPP
Ile de France III, approval n◦ Am5569-1- 2489) for this
research. Data from three participants were excluded from the
analysis: two failed to correctly identify the competent individual




The ﬁrst-order 2AFC task was a number estimation task where
participants judged if target displays contained more or fewer
dots than a reference display. The displays consisted of arrays of
white dots (10-pixel diameter) randomly distributed on a black
disk (320-pixel diameter), with at least 10 pixels separating the
dots from each other. For target displays, the number of dots
varied from 32 to 68 by increments of 4, while the number of
dots was ﬁxed at 50 for the reference display. Task diﬃculty was
manipulated by varying the diﬀerence in the number of dots
separating the target from the reference displays. This diﬀerence
ranged from ±2 to ±18 dots in ﬁve increments, yielding ﬁve
levels of task diﬃculty. Using a program in Matlab, we randomly
generated 48 diﬀerent target displays for each distance, as well as
10 diﬀerent reference displays.
Social Stimuli
The social stimuli consisted of 1.5-s videos created for the
purpose of the experiment (see Supplementary Methods).
Individuals who did not have distinctive features (e.g., mustache,
piercing, jewelry, etc.) were ﬁlmed wearing black t-shirts against
a white background under the same lighting conditions. They
were ﬁlmed individually and frames contained fontal views that
included the top of the head to the shoulders. Several videos were
ﬁlmed for each expression: agreement (i.e., smiling and nodding),
disagreement (i.e., frowning and head shaking), and uncertainty
(i.e., raising eyebrows and shrugging). These were non-verbal
facial expressions consisting of head movements and were ﬁlmed
in an ecologically valid context (see Supplementary Methods).
A series of pre-tests were conducted to select the videos from
two pairs of individuals (one pair of females and one pair of
males; mean age = 32.75 years, SD = 2.22) who were matched
for perceived competence and trustworthiness. We selected three
videos from each individual, one for each of the expressions
(agreement, disagreement or uncertainty). We paired videos that
were judged in pre-tests to be equally persuasive and emotional
in the context of our experimental task. Each participant was




Participants were individually tested in a room where they were
seated approximately 90 cm away from a 17-inch LCD monitor.
Stimulus presentation was conducted using the E-Prime 2.0
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA).
Each trial was initiated by a 400-ms presentation of a ﬁxation
cross, followed by a brief 100-ms target display. The symbols
“−” and “+” appeared on the left and right sides of the screen,
respectively, 300 ms after the disappearance of the target, and
remained onscreen until the participant gave his/her response.
Using a two-choice button, participants had to decide whether
the target display contained more (“+”) or fewer (“−”) dots
than the reference display. After participants responded, they
were presented with a 1.5 s video of a social agent displaying an
expression and were asked to indicate their level of conﬁdence
in their response using a scale of 0 (not conﬁdent at all) to
100 (very conﬁdent). The scale remained available on the screen
for participants to respond for up to 3000 ms (Figure 1). Each
participant completed 10 blocks of 24 trials and each block
began with a reference display that was presented for 3000 ms.
Participants had to keep the reference display in mind to be able
to evaluate the upcoming target stimuli.
Belief Manipulation
Participants were led to believe that the individuals seen in
the videos were actual participants who previously took part in
the same experiment. In each trial, the individual’s expression
supposedly reﬂected that “PP’s” answer to the very same dot
question. We explained that an expression of agreement would
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FIGURE 1 | Time course of an experimental trial.
be shown when the PP gave the same response as the participant.
If the PP gave the opposite response, the participant would
see an expression of disagreement. If the PP did not respond,
an expression of uncertainty would appear. To ensure the
story’s credibility, participants were ﬁlmed before beginning the
experiment (wearing a black t-shirt and expressing agreement,
disagreement, or uncertainty) andwere told that the videos would
be used in future sessions of the experiment.
Competence Manipulation
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were presented
with a picture of the two PPs they would see in the experimental
session and each PP’s ﬁctive success rates for the task. These
scores were manipulated in order to present one of the PPs
as being more competent at the task than the other. They
were randomly generated to be between 94.0 and 98.9% for
the “competent” PP and between 61.0 and 65.9% for the
“incompetent” PP. The two PPs used in each experimental session
were always of the same gender and half of the participants were
presented with two female PPs while the other half viewed two
male PPs. The PP competence associations were counterbalanced
across participants.
Block Distribution
In order to reinforce the association between PPs and level of
competence, the experiment began with two blocks of easy trials
(Diﬃculty 1 and 2). In these induction blocks, the “competent”
PP gave correct feedback on 80% of the trials (agreement if
the participant gave the correct answer, disagreement if not),
incorrect feedback on 10% of the trials (disagreement if the
participant gave the correct answer and agreement if not),
and expressed uncertainty on the remaining 10% of trials. By
contrast, the “incompetent” PP gave correct feedback in only
20% of cases, incorrect feedback in 40% and uncertainty in the
other 40%. We included only the easy trials so that participants
could easily discern correct from incorrect feedback. During
these induction blocks, participants performed 12 trials per
diﬃculty level (2) and PP (2), resulting in 48 trials that were
randomly distributed between the two blocks. After the two
induction blocks, participants performed three experimental
blocks comprising harder trials (diﬃculty 3, 4, and 5). In these
blocks, both PPs provided random feedback, expressing an equal
number of agreement, disagreement and uncertainty expressions
(i.e., 33%). These three experimental blocks immediately followed
the twomanipulation blocks so that participants would not notice
the change in feedback distribution. The experimental block
consisted of 12 trials per level of diﬃculty (3) and per PP (2).
All 72 trials were randomly divided across the three blocks. The
entire procedure (two induction blocks and three experimental
blocks) was repeated twice. Participants performed 240 trials in
total, of which 144 (experimental trials) were analyzed.
Post-Test
At the end of the experiment, pictures of the PPs with
neutral expressions were presented together on the screen
and participants had to choose the most “competent” one.
Next, each PP was presented individually and participants were
asked to indicate (“yes” or “no”) whether they thought the
PP had inﬂuenced their conﬁdence, and to what extent (on a
scale of 0–3). Participants were also asked to indicate each PPs
competence and trustworthiness on a scale of −5 (“not at all”)
to 5 (“entirely”).
Electrophysiological Data Recording and
Reduction
We collected surface facial EMG recordings from each
participant using the ADInstrument acquisition system
(ML870/P Powerlab 8/30). It has been shown that the right
hemisphere of the brain is responsible for spontaneous
emotional facial reactions (Dimberg and Petterson, 2000), so the
EMG electrodes were placed on the left side of each participant’s
face.
Throughout the experiment, we continuously recorded
corrugator supercilii (eyebrow frowning) and zygomaticus
major (elevation of the mouth corners) muscle activity using
Sensormedics 4 mm shielded Ag/AgCl miniature electrodes.
Each muscle’s activity was recorded by two electrodes placed on
the muscle about 1.25 cm apart (center to center), and roughly
parallel to the muscle. The ground electrode was placed at the
bottom of the neck dorsally. Before attaching the electrodes,
target sites were cleaned with alcohol and rubbed to reduce
inter-electrode impedance. The signal was recorded with a
sampling frequency of 2 kHz and a band-pass online ﬁlter of
500 Hz and then integrated.
Because RFRs were reported to occur during the ﬁrst second
of presentation of a face (Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg
et al., 2000; Moody et al., 2007), for each trial of the experimental
blocks, we extracted the EMG data collected 300 ms before to
1000 ms after video onset. Integral values were then subsampled
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oﬄine at 10 Hz, resulting in the extraction of 100-ms time bins.
EMG trials containing a noisy baseline (2 SD above or below the
mean) were rejected.
Next, the data were log-transformed [Ln (μV)] to reduce
the impact of extreme values and standardized (transformed to
Z-scores) for each participant and for each muscle. Finally, the




Analyses were conducted on the experimental blocks, which
included 144 trials in total. Accuracy and reaction times (RTs) for
the dot task were submitted to repeated measures ANOVAs using
Diﬃculty (3, 4, 5) as a within-subject factor. A repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted on conﬁdence ratings with Competence
(Competent vs. Incompetent), Expression (Agreement vs.
Disagreement vs. Uncertainty) and Diﬃculty (3, 4, 5) as within-
subject factors. Taking into account the sphericity assumption, we
adjusted the degrees of freedom using the Greenhouse–Geisser
correction when appropriate (in this case, ε and corrected p
values were reported). Planned comparisons were performed
when main eﬀects or interactions were observed.
We conducted t-tests to compare the two PPs on the
diﬀerent variables recorded during the post-test: Competence,
Trustworthiness, and the degree of inﬂuence of the PPs. The post-
test indicated that two of the 28 participants did not explicitly
recognize the competent agent and another individual reported
an extreme value for conﬁdence (>2 SD above the mean). All
three participants were excluded from the analyses.
Electrophysiological Data
Participants with a high rate of trial rejection (2 SD above
the mean rate; i.e., >25%) were excluded from the analyses
on zygomatic (n = 2) and corrugator (n = 2) activity.
The data for each muscle were submitted separately to a
repeated measures ANOVA with Competence (Competent vs.
Incompetent), Expression (Agreement vs. Disagreement vs.
Uncertainty), Diﬃculty (3, 4, 5) and Time Windows (10)
as within-subject factors. Taking into account the sphericity
assumption, we adjusted the degrees of freedom using the
Greenhouse–Geisser correction when appropriate (in this case,
ε and corrected p values were reported). Planned comparisons





The ANOVAs conducted for performance on the dot task
showed a main eﬀect of Diﬃculty in accuracy [F(4,24) = 216.32,
ε = 0.73, pcorr < 0.0001] and in RTs [F(4,24) = 36.02, ε = 0.43,
pcorr < 0.0001]. Planned comparisons showed that accuracy
decreased (all ps< 0.05), while RTs increased (all ps < 0.05) with
task diﬃculty (See Table 1).
TABLE 1 | Accuracy and response time by each level of difficulty for the
first order-task (with SD).
Difficulty 3 Difficulty 4 Difficulty 5
Accuracy (in %) 91 ± 6,6 80.75 ± 8.25 61.25 ± 8.37
Reaction times (in ms) 851 ± 379 1100 ± 416 1374 ± 665
Confidence
The ANOVA indicated a main eﬀect of Diﬃculty
[F(2,48) = 38.44, ε = 0.69; pcorr < 0.0001]. Conﬁdence
decreased when task diﬃculty increased (all ps < 0.005).
A main eﬀect of Expression was also observed [F(2,48) = 22.01,
ε = 0.72; pcorr < 0.0001]. Agreement led to higher conﬁdence
than Disagreement [t(24) = 5.82; p < 0.0001—mean eﬀect
size = 7.75 ± 1.51] and Uncertainty [t(24) = 5.13; p < 0.0001—
mean eﬀect size = 6.27 ± 1.30]. Disagreement and Uncertainty
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly [t(24) = 1.85; p > 0.05— mean
diﬀerence = 1.48 ± 0.79], suggesting that Disagreement did not
impact conﬁdence in our experimental design. Importantly, we
observed an interaction between Competence and Expression
[F(2,48) = 10.49, ε = 0.91; pcorr < 0.0001], indicating that
agreement expressed by the competent PP has a greater impact
on conﬁdence than agreement expressed by the incompetent PP
[t(24) = 3.78; p< 0.001 – Figure 2].
Post-Test
The t-tests revealed that, after performing the task, the competent
PP was perceived as being more competent [t(24) = 9.05,
p< 0.0001] but also more trustworthy [t(24) = 6.03, p< 0.0001]
than the incompetent PP (Figure 3). Moreover, 88% of
participants reported having been inﬂuenced by the competent
PP, while 52% of participants reported having been inﬂuenced
by the incompetent PP. The competent PP was also reported to
have inﬂuenced participants’ conﬁdence more intensely than the
incompetent PP [t(24) = 4.86, p < 0.0001]. A one-sample t-test
against zero conﬁrmed that participants reported having been
inﬂuenced by both the competent and the incompetent PPs [all
t(24) > 4.0, all ps < 0.001, Figure 3].
Electrophysiological Results
Zygomaticus
The ANOVA did not reveal any main eﬀects of our factors,
but a main eﬀect of Time Windows [F(9,198) = 2.3,
ε = 0.52, pcorr < 0.05]. However, a three-way interaction
among Competence, Expression and Diﬃculty was observed
[F(4,88) = 2.6, ε = 0.90, pcorr < 0.05]. Agreement expressed by
the competent PP induced elevated zygomaticus activity when
compared to Disagreement expressed by that same PP. This eﬀect
was largest for diﬃculty level 5 [i.e., hardest trials; t(22) = 2.16;
p < 0.05], where Agreement also induced greater activity than
Uncertainty [t(22) = 2.36; p < 0.05]. The diﬀerence between
Agreement and Disagreement tended to reach signiﬁcant for
diﬃculty 4 [t(22) = 1,74; p = 0.09], but disappeared for
diﬃculty 3 [i.e., easiest trials; t(22) = 1.44; p> 0.1]. Importantly,
these modulations were not observed for the expressions of the
incompetent PP (all ps> 0.2 – Figure 4).
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FIGURE 2 | Confidence levels as a function of experimental conditions. (A) Mean subjective confidence levels as a function of Competence (Competent vs.
Incompetent), Expression (Agreement vs. Disagreement vs. Uncertainty) and Difficulty (3 vs. 4 vs. 5) with SE bars. (B) Mean subjective confidence levels as a function
of Competence (Competent vs. Incompetent) and Expression (Agreement vs. Disagreement vs. Uncertainty) with SE bars. The data were averaged across different
difficulty levels.
FIGURE 3 | Post-test results. Participants’ explicit evaluation of social agents at the end of the experiment with SE bars. The asterisks indicate significant statistical
difference.
Corrugators
The ANOVA did not reveal any main eﬀects of our factors, but
a main eﬀect of Time Windows [F(9,198) = 6.27, ε = 0.46,
pcorr < 0.01]. Moreover, it did not reveal any interactions of
our factors on corrugator activity (all Fs < 2.28; all ps > 0.1).
We had expected to ﬁnd corrugator activity in the disagreement
condition, as previous experiments have shown an impact of
negative emotional displays on this muscle’s activity (Larsen
et al., 2003). There are two possible explanations for this lack
of corrugator activity modulation: ﬁrstly, the lack of impact of
disagreement on conﬁdence suggest that this expression was
not judged particularly relevant for the task by the participants.
Secondly, it is known that corrugators are sensitive to task
diﬃculty (van Boxtel, 2010). Here, the dot task was immediately
followed by social feedback, so there may have been a carryover
eﬀect of task diﬃculty on corrugator activity, which would
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FIGURE 4 | Zygomaticus activity as a function of experimental conditions. (A) Time course of mean EMG activity at the onset of the social feedback: mean
EMG activity of zygomaticus in μV as a function of Competence (Incompetent vs. Competent) and Expression (Agreement vs. Disagreement vs. Uncertainty). Activity
reflects average activation during each 100 ms time interval. (B) Mean EMG activity of zygomaticus between 0 and 1000 ms: mean EMG activity of Zygomatic in μV
as a function of Competence (Incompetent vs. Competent), Expression (Agreement vs. Disagreement vs. Uncertainty) and Difficulty (3, 4, 5) with SE bars.
contaminate the eﬀect of feedback. This last possibility limits any
further interpretation of corrugator activity patterns.
Discussion
In this experiment, we investigated whether non-verbal social
feedback provided by sources with varying epistemic reliability
modulates metacognitive evaluations. To this end, we explored
how subjective conﬁdence in performance on a ﬁrst-order
task and RFRs to non-verbal social feedback varied as a
function of the reliability of the social source. The results
indicated that individuals always integrated social agreement into
the elaboration of their metacognitive evaluation, even when
mechanisms for epistemic vigilance alert participants to the
risk of being misinformed. Albeit to a lesser extent, agreement
provided by an unreliable source still impacted participants’
post-decision conﬁdence ratings. However, when asked explicitly,
participants were able to distinguish competent informants from
incompetent ones. In addition, the RFRs indicated an implicit
processing of the competence attributed to the social source.
Regarding subjective conﬁdence, our ﬁndings revealed a
pattern similar to that reported by Eskenazi et al. (in revision).
Participants adjusted their conﬁdence ratings as a function of
the information provided by another individual’s non-verbal
cues. In Eskenazi et al. (in revision, Experiment 2) participants’
conﬁdence ratings were higher after another person (presented as
PP) had oriented his/her gaze toward their response than in the
absence of social cues. Here, we found that subjective conﬁdence
levels were higher after an individual expressed agreement as
compared to disagreement or uncertainty. Eskenazi et al. (in
revision, Experiment 2) also found participants’ conﬁdence
ratings to be lower after another person had oriented his/her
gaze toward the opposite response, compared to when there
was no social cue. Here, however, perceived disagreement was
not associated with lower levels of conﬁdence than perceived
uncertainty. This might be explained by the fact that perceived
uncertainty was not neutral; in fact, it may have been suﬃcient
in lowering participants’ conﬁdence. However, we deem it
unlikely. That is because any eﬀect of perceived disagreement
or uncertainty should have been modulated by source reliability
just as the eﬀect of perceived agreement was. The absence of
such modulation by source reliability converges toward the view
that others’ disagreement and uncertainty were not judged task-
relevant by the participants and thus did not impact conﬁdence.
This may reveal further that other’s gaze direction is processed
in a more reﬂexive manner than the facial expressions we
used in the current study. It is well known that, as soon
as 3 months of age, human infants automatically orient their
attention toward the direction an adult’s eyes turn (Hood
et al., 1998; Farroni et al., 2000; Senju et al., 2006). In adults,
such mechanism has been proved to aﬀect automatically our
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evaluations about object of the environment looked at by others
(Bayliss et al., 2006, 2007; Manera et al., 2014). Incongruent gaze
direction might be more diﬃcult to ignore than more complex
disagreeing facial expressions. Anyway, in Eskenazi et al. (in
revision), the eﬀect of congruent gaze was signiﬁcantly higher
than the eﬀect of incongruent gaze. Together with the present
results, these ﬁndings support the view that positive/concordant
information (i.e., agreement) has a stronger eﬀect on conﬁdence
judgments than negative/disapproving social information (i.e.,
disagreement).
Two main (non-exclusive) mechanisms may account
for this agreement eﬀect. First, the particular sensitivity to
agreement possibly reﬂects the individuals’ biased tendency to
see themselves in a positive light (Leary, 2007) and to expect
positive rather than negative feedback (Hepper et al., 2011). It
has been suggested that this tendency helps people maintain a
positive self-concept (Taylor and Brown, 1988). In other words,
the particular susceptibility to social agreement reported here
may reﬂect a self-serving bias. Individuals seemed to reject
the validity of the disagreeing feedback, focusing on their
potential success while overlooking their potential failures.
It is well-known that a self-serving bias heavily inﬂuences
judgment processes (Fiske et al., 2007). Here, we suggest
that a self-serving bias can also inﬂuence one’s metacognitive
evaluations of past decisions. Alternatively, it is possible that
agreements are automatically appraised as being more reliable
than disagreement or uncertainty. It is well-known that positive
feelings in one area cause other traits to be viewed positively, a
form of conﬁrmation bias called the “halo eﬀect” (Thorndike,
1920; Asch, 1946; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Consistently, when
not manipulated for reliability, all of our videos were judged to be
more competent, persuasive, and trustworthy when expressing
agreement than disagreement or uncertainty (see Supplementary
Methods-Pre-test 3).
Importantly, the impact of agreement or positive social
feedback on subjective conﬁdence ratings was greater when it
was provided by a competent rather than an incompetent social
source. This demonstrates that participants were sensitive to
the epistemic reliability of the social source, which modulated
the weight they assigned to the social information when
elaborating their metacognitive evaluations. Moreover, the post-
tests highlighted that the “competent” individual was rated as
being more competent as well as more trustworthy. This suggests
that competence judgments automatically led participants to
calibrate trust as well (Fiske et al., 2007). However, this eﬀect may
not be speciﬁc to competence. The halo eﬀect predicts that the
competent agent was not only judged as more trustworthy, but
that he/she was perceived in a more positive light overall than
the incompetent agent. This eﬀect may have mediated the greater
impact of the competent agent’s agreement on conﬁdence. This
implies, for example, that in-group members (who are known
to be appraised more positively than out-group members; e.g.,
Molenberghs, 2013) would have a similar eﬀect on conﬁdence
than the competent agent in our study.
Furthermore, electrophysiological results indicated
zygomaticus activity in response to agreement when expressed
by the competent individual, but only on diﬃcult trials, i.e.,
when participants were uncertain about their performance on
the ﬁrst-order task. This eﬀect emerged for the medium level
of diﬃculty (Diﬃculty 4) and reached its maximum for the
highest level (Diﬃculty 5). This suggests that RFRs depend on
the reliability attributed to the source, but also on the perceiver’s
informational needs. Our physiological results demonstrate ﬁrst
that participants implicitly processed the reliability of the source.
They further highlight that they processed social feedback as a
function of its relevance to their current goal, such that social
cues with high informative value ampliﬁed the EMG activity.
RFRs are thought to predominantly reﬂect the outcome of
non-aﬀective motor mimicry (Bavelas et al., 1986; Chartrand and
Bargh, 1999), which initially evolved to identify the emotional
expression of perceived faces (Hatﬁeld and Rapson, 1993;
Niedenthal et al., 2005; McIntosh, 2006) and then to encourage
aﬃliation by favoring liking (Lakin et al., 2003). However, it
has also been suggested that RFRs reﬂect the emotional readout
of the perceived facial expression (Cacioppo et al., 1986; Buck,
1994; Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998; Grèzes et al., 2013), which
may vary substantially as a function of its relevance to the self
(Grèzes et al., 2013; Soussignan et al., 2013, 2015). Our results
best ﬁt the second hypothesis. In this study, ampliﬁed activity
found in the zygomaticus likely reﬂects the participants’ sense
that social agreement indicates a higher probability of success
in the task than anticipated (Carver and Scheier, 1990). In
other words, it might correspond to the positive experience of
having one’s response conﬁrmed by a competent individual –
a positive experience that increases with uncertainty about
prior performance. The pattern of zygomaticus activity is thus
consistent with reports of increased zygomaticus activity with the
reward value attributed to smiling faces (Sims et al., 2012) and
with arousal level of pleasant facial expressions (Fujimura et al.,
2010). The data further suggest that the zygomaticus responses
we observed are contingent on the participants’ expectations at
each trial.
Interestingly, the social-functional perspective assumes that
emotions enable individuals to respond to the situation at hand
(Keltner and Haidt, 1999). One may thus expect that the positive
experience reﬂected in the zygomaticus activity contributes to the
elaboration of the participant’s conﬁdence judgment, which in
turn leads to an increase in conﬁdence. Intriguingly, however, the
behavioral data did not follow the same pattern as the RFR results.
We observed that positive feedback from both the competent and
the incompetent source impacted conﬁdence independently of
task diﬃculty. We might thus speculate that the modulations in
conﬁdence we observed reﬂect an automatic association between
another person’s approval and higher subjective conﬁdence in
one’s own decision. Another person’s endorsement of one’s own
prior response may be motivationally strong enough to raise
conﬁdence in that response in a non-analytic manner, even
when the source has been presented and appraised as unreliable.
We thus speculate that while agreement automatically increases
participants’ conﬁdence, the emotional response reﬂected in the
zygomaticus activity depends on context appraisal. This proposal
implies that inhibiting RFRs during our experiment would not
impact the eﬀect of agreement on conﬁdence. The lack of a clear
dissociation between the eﬀects may reveal a discrete role of the
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emotional reaction (which is reﬂected in zygomaticus activity)
in mediating the impact of social agreement on participants’
conﬁdence.
It is also noteworthy that in the post-test, participants reported
having been inﬂuenced by the incompetent individual, even
though they rated him/her as incompetent and untrustworthy.
This is in line with the ﬁnding that the implicit processing
of social information may be dissociated from explicit beliefs
(Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Forgas et al., 2003; Hassin et al., 2005;
Bargh, 2006). This further suggests that participants were partly
aware of their failure to screen social information as a function of
its reliability. They seem to always integrate agreement into the
elaboration of their metacognitive evaluation.
Previous studies have shown that individuals have
an irrational susceptibility to social feedback, treating it
indiscriminately as reliable information (Bahrami et al., 2010;
Eskenazi et al., in revision). This may be due to the fact that
social feedback is reliable more often than not in natural settings.
In line with this notion, others have claimed that cooperation
has become an evolutionarily stable strategy that motivates
the perception of other participants as knowledgeable and
trustworthy partners (Tomasello, 2014). However, although it
is generally an adaptive strategy, such social susceptibility can
also be detrimental, compromising performance (Bahrami et al.,
2010) as well as the accuracy with which performance is evaluated
(i.e., metacognitive sensitivity; Eskenazi et al., in revision).
The present study advances those ﬁndings by demonstrating
that individuals are particularly susceptible to positive social
feedback, even when they are aware of its unreliability. Here,
we propose that this apparently irrational tendency to take
on board another’s conﬁrmation when forming metacognitive
evaluations is driven by the motivation to maintain a positive
self-concept. Moreover, one could further speculate that such
self-serving bias has implications for goal achievement. By
maintaining a positive self-concept and enhancing conﬁdence,
positive social feedback may help individuals engage in the task
and devote resources which would eventually improve success
(Custers and Aarts, 2005). Likewise, positive reinforcement
has been shown to strongly inﬂuence learning (Jones et al.,
2011).
Conclusion
Even though we are able to distinguish reliable from unreliable
informants both implicitly and explicitly, when elaborating
metacognitive evaluations of our past decisions, we are inclined
to treat social feedback as reliable when it is conﬁrmatory. Our
results further highlight that negative social feedback is not as
eﬀective at impacting one’s conﬁdence in oneself. This positively
biased processing of social information is robust and may play an
instrumental role in social learning that should be addressed in
further investigations.
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